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The United Nations Compensation
Commission: Mass Reparations Apotheosis
BY GREGORY TOWNSEND*
I. INTRODUCTION
I am honored to contribute to this 40th anniversary symposium
issue of the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law
Review. For the 1995–1996 academic school year in the last
millennium, the outgoing editorial board selected me to serve as Editorin-Chief of volume 18 of the (then) Loyola of Los Angeles International
and Comparative Law Journal.1 Having had, with great fortune, the ‘red
pen’ passed to me, I spent the next year toiling with, among other
things, correcting the torturous syntax of several articles, learning
Christensen copyediting symbols (and deciphering others’ use of them),2
and mollifying authors with belated edits to their already finalized
galley proofs. Despite these rites of passage experienced by all review
staff, in retrospect, what I remember and cherish most is the
camaraderie and support of my fellow students (including on long,
weekend, pizza-fueled ‘production days’), our engaging, often heated,
and erudite legal and editorial debates, and our shared pride in finally
putting an issue ‘to bed.’ Flush with these memories of my heady
learning experience working on a journal and twenty years spent since
then working on accountability for United Nations institutions, it was an
easy decision to respond in the affirmative when asked to contribute a
paper to this symposium.
After leaving Loyola Law in 1996, and with the help of several
mentors, including Professor Laurie Levenson, I entered the criminal
* Gregory Townsend (J.D. Loyola Law School 1996; D.E.S. IUHEI, Université de
Genève 1993; M.A.L.D. Fletcher School, Tufts University 1992; B.A. UCLA 1988) is currently
employed as a Lecturer in International Law at The Hague University and Lecturer in Law for
UCLA School of Law, based in The Hague. He served as Editor-in-Chief of the Loyola Los
Angeles International & Comparative Law Review in 1995-96.
1. See About the Review, LOY. L. SCH. L.A., INT’L & COMP. L. REV.,
https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/about.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
2. See JOE CHRISTENSEN INC., http://www.christensen.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
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law field. In 1998, I left the excellent training grounds of the Los
Angeles Public Defender’s Office when I received a job offer (on
thermal fax paper) from the United Nations (“UN”) International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, based in Arusha, Tanzania, where I
grabbed the opportunity and spent more than seven years working on
genocide cases and prosecuting some notable trials. This experience had
a lasting impact on me, both professionally and personally. One UN job
in international criminal law led to another, including going from
Arusha to Kosovo to Sierra Leone to The Hague. In 2018, twenty years
after ‘temporarily’ joining the UN, I completed my most recent UN
contract at my sixth international criminal jurisdiction, the UN
International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. My practice
today remains focused on international criminal law and teaching the
subject.
While studying in Geneva in 1992, my previous interest in public
international law was sparked by a guest lecture on the topic of the UN
Compensation Commission (“UNCC”). This lecture by John R. Crook,
Counselor for Legal Affairs at the U.S. Mission in Geneva and an early
U.S. proponent of the UNCC, directly led to my writing of my
comment.
My graduation from Loyola Law in 1996 serendipitously
coincided with the resurgence of international criminal law and, lucky
for me, an upturn in the number of UN jobs in this niche area. Today,
however, the job market is shrinking, internationalism is retrenching,
and prospects waning that the international community will close gaps
in impunity in recent armed conflicts.
In Part II of this paper, I provide a succinct overview of my lesssuccinct, fifty-five page, 1995 comment on the UNCC.3 In Part III, I
give an update on the UNCC since the passage of twenty-four years
since publication of my comment. In Part IV, I give a pithy and positive
assessment of the UNCC in its twenty-seventh year of what appears
likely to be a thirty year life span, noting its legal innovations and
accomplishments. Finally, in Part V, I conclude by remarking that the
success of the UNCC is partially attributable to the relative consensus
within the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) that
characterized the years of the UNCC’s establishment and operation in
the 1990s and early 2000s.
3. See generally Gregory Townsend, Comment, The Iraq Claims Process: A Progress
Report on the United Nations Compensation Commission & U.S. Remedies, 17 LOY. L.A. INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 973 (1995).
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In this immediate post-Cold War era, the permanent members of
the UNSC were in accord on questions of international justice.4 It was
this same period of consensus that saw the UNSC establish the UN
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993 and
the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994, and the
international community adopt the Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court in 1998.5 I mention this not only out of a
sense of nostalgia but to put the UNCC in this political and temporal
context for the purpose of assessing it today.
II. OVERVIEW OF 1995 COMMENT
While recently re-reading my 1995 comment, what first struck me
is that the viability of the UNCC really hung in the balance for the first
phase of its existence. Today, in the twilight of the UNCC, we can look
back, take its existence for granted, and fail to appreciate the breadth
and size of its accomplishments as the “largest-ever war reparation
exercise.”6 In 1995, this was far from evident. The UNCC’s first
Executive Secretary conceded that the institution constituted “an
unprecedented experiment in international practice” and commentators
debated its “legitimacy.”7 Critics saw the UNCC as “doomed” because
it would never garner sufficient funds to compensate the victims of
Iraq’s invasion,8 occupation, and damage to Kuwait in 1990 and the
First Gulf War that followed in 19919 The “UNCC’s sine qua non was
[always] the availability of money to pay claims.” 10 Labeled
“retributive,” “disturbing” by those contending that the UNSC had
violated Iraqi sovereignty, and “unduly imposing of” the process upon a
4. See generally DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBRARY, UN Documentation: International
Law, https://research.un.org/en/docs/law/courts (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
5. Id.
6. Veijo Heiskanen, The United Nations Compensation Commission, in 296 RECUEIL DES
COURS 259, 268 (2002).
7. Carlos Alzamora, The UN Compensation Commission: An Overview, in THE UNITED
NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION: THIRTEENTH SOKOL COLLOQUIUM 3 (Richard B. Lillich
ed., 1995); David D. Caron, The UNCC and the Search for Practical Justice, in THE UNITED
NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION: THIRTEENTH SOKOL COLLOQUIUM 367 (Richard B.
Lillich ed., 1995).
8. Alan D. Meltzer, The United Nations Compensation Commission, 90 AM. J. INT’L L.
532, 533 (1996) (reviewing THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION (Richard B.
Lillich ed., 1995) and noting that “the UNCC’s ultimate legacy remains uncertain, as it continues
to lack sufficient funding to pay most claim awards”).
9. See Townsend, supra note 3, at 975.
10. Jeremy Carver, Introduction: International Claims Litigation II: A Case Study on the
UNCC, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 325, 326 (2005).
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vanquished Iraq,11 the UNCC appeared to be in jeopardy. The UNCC
risked the political tides turning, being one UNSC vote away from
dissolution,12 and unable ‘“to produce anything except jobs for
international bureaucrats.’”13 The UNSC, however, was consistent from
the start on the liability of Iraq pursuant to international law for any
loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait.14 As time would tell,
the UNCC eventually turned a corner when Iraq finally started to
replenish its compensation fund. This replenishing of the UNCC’s
compensation fund put it in a position to process an unprecedented
volume of claims settlements, both in terms of the number of claims and
the overall monetary value of the compensation claims payments.
My comment described the UNCC’s legal nature and structure,
stating that the UNCC’s mandate was not judicial or adjudicatory but
rather administrative, fact-finding, and political.15 Those establishing the
UNCC modeled it on U.S. mass tort claims administration.16 It is
noteworthy that the UNCC served as a subsidiary organ of the UNSC,
and its Governing Council mirrored the UNSC’s (partially rotating)
membership.17 In retrospect, this structure ensured that the UNCC had
strong political support, which it retains to this day.
As of 2019, we know the UNCC “has paid out $48.1 billion” in
claims compensation.18 This payout is a staggering figure, even more so
as it is in stark contrast to the situation in 1994, when the UNCC did not
have on hand sufficient funds, $200 million, to compensate even its first
claimants, victims forced to depart Iraq or Kuwait.19 These victims
claimed a fixed sum between $2,500 and $8,000.20 In 1995, the UNCC
11. See Townsend, supra note 3, at 975.
12. See id. at 979; see also Michael Raboin, Summary of Remarks: Part 2: The UNCC and
Future International Claims Practice, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 332-33 (2005) (noting that
for those at the UNCC, “[o]ne of our constant fears was that the Security Council would
discontinue the UNCC for political reasons before we could process all the claims”).
13. Townsend, supra note 3, at 1025.
14. See S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16 (Apr. 3, 1991).
15. Townsend, supra note 3, at 978.
16. Id. at 986.
17. See id. at 982; see also Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Danio Campanelli, The
United Nations Compensation Commission: Time for Assessment?, in FRIEDEN IN FREIHEIT:
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR 3, 7 (Andreas Fischer-Lescano, et al eds., 2008). Iraq has not been elected as a
non-permanent member of the UNSC since 1974-1975.
18. Press Release, U.N. Compensation Comm’n, United Nations Compensation
Commission Pays Out US $100 Million, U.N. Press Release PR/2019/1 (Jan 18, 2019)
[hereinafter Press Release, U.N. Doc. PR/2019/1].
19. Townsend, supra note 3, at 988, 1005.
20. Id.
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also could not pay some of those making claims for personal injury and
death of family members.21 As of 1995, the UNCC’s claim settlement
process was just getting underway for the various categories of claims
and deadlines for submission of some claims were still pending.
My 1995 comment indicated that the lack of Iraqi compliance with
UNSC resolutions stymied the UNCC claims process and proposed
possible solutions.22 Most curious, in retrospect, is that some of the then,
more far-fetched solutions played out to some extent in future years.
The UNSC waited out a change in the Iraqi government,23 and the
UNSC enacted more drastic sanctions in the years following the
change,24 though largely in relation to purported biological weapons and
other so-called weapons of mass destruction.25 While the UNSC did not
take control of Iraqi oil production,26 U.S. military action achieved
“regime change” without UN Charter Chapter 7 authorization in the
Second Gulf War from 2003. Successor Iraqi governments could do
little but comply with the UNSC’s previous imposition of liability for
compensation stemming from the 1990–1991 invasion and occupation
of Kuwait.27
The UNCC remains one of a kind. In 1995, I concluded that the
UNCC would “prove itself a successful and innovative international
institution” once Iraq made available funding from its oil sales. 28 I still
agree with that proposition today, but what I grossly under estimated
was the duration of the international political impasse in Iraq. What I
guessed to be potentially two years was many more.29 I suspect this
under estimate was attributable both to the impatience of my youth and
perhaps the tenacity of Saddam Hussein’s regime to remain in power,
blocking the UNCC from making progress on the bigger claims.
III. UPDATE SINCE 1995
Between 1991 (when established), 1995 (the year of publication of
my “progress report” comment) and today, in 2019, the UNCC has
made tremendous progress. Summing up the UNCC by its milestones
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 990.
Id. at 1011, 1019.
Id. at 1020.
Id. at 1021.
See id. at 1016, 1026.
See id. at 1022-23.
See id. at 976.
Id. at 1026.
Id. at 1025-26.
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and figures over the course of its nearly twenty-seven years of
existence, its most recent press release of January 18, 2019 reported:
The Commission received approximately 2.7 million claims and
concluded its review of all claims in 2005. Approximately $52.4
billion was awarded to over 100 Governments and international
organizations for distribution to 1.5 million claims in all claim
categories … [as of January 18, 2019] the Commission has paid out
$48.1 billion, leaving approximately $4.3 billion remaining to be
paid to the only claim with an outstanding award balance. This
category E claim was submitted by the Government of the State of
Kuwait on behalf of the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and awarded
$14.7 billion in 2000 for oil production and sales losses as a result of
damages to Kuwait’s oil field assets. It represents the largest award
30
by the Commission.

The UNCC anticipates paying out the $4.3 billion balance of this
one, last remaining claim to the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation by the
end of 2021. The year 2021 will represent the UNCC’s thirtieth year of
operation, having been established by UNSC Resolution 687 (the
ceasefire resolution) of April 3, 1991.31 It seems unlikely that anyone
working for the UNSC would have anticipated that the UNCC would
last that long, let alone that it would decide 2.7 million claims, granting
1.5 million, and paying out more than $52 billion. This is remarkable
and exceeds expectations, especially considering that the Security
Council at first set up the UNCC to have the “ultimate objective . . . to
provide some rough sense of justice for the little guy,” namely
claimants in “small” claims categories.32
The UNCC was speedy in processing most claims.33 One panel
finished category “B” claims in 1995, category “A” in 1996,34 and
30. Press Release, U.N. Doc. PR/2019/1, supra note 18.
31. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 14, ¶ 6.
32. Nicholas C. Ulmer, Claimant’s Expectations from the United Nations Compensation
Commission, 15 J. INT’L ARB. 7 (1998).
33. See generally Francis E. McGovern, Dispute System Design: The United Nations
Compensation Commission, in WAR REPARATIONS AND THE UN COMPENSATION COMMISSION:
DESIGNING COMPENSATION AFTER CONFLICT 29, 30 (Timothy J. Feighery, et. al., eds., 2015)
[hereinafter WAR REPARATIONS] (noting that the UNCC had completed the entire claim review
process by June 2005, including after late-filed claims); see also Jason Scott Palmer, The
Palestinian “Late Claims” Program: Remedying Mistakes in Mass Claims Processing Without
Compounding the Error, in WAR REPARATIONS 103, 133 (discussing the so-called “late” claims
before the UNCC and concluding that future claims processes should anticipate claims after the
deadlines from deserving claimants).
34. See generally Iñigo Salvador-Crespo, Making Good for Forced Exodus: Compensation
for Departure from Iraq or Kuwait—Claims of Individuals: “A” Claims, in WAR REPARATIONS,
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category “C” in 1999.35 Thus, the UNCC paid out these three “urgent”
categories first, which represent the numerical bulk of the claims within
eight years of the armed conflict.
A. Funds for Compensation
UNSC Resolution 705 (1991) fixed the percentage of Iraqi oil
proceeds that fund compensation to not exceed 30% (based on previous
Iraqi domestic military spending).36 From 1991–1996 however, the
UNCC did not secure the billions of dollars needed to fund this
ambitious undertaking in mass claims compensation.37 The UNSC’s
credibility and the UNCC’s viability were precariously on the line. It
seemed possible that the UNCC would award only pennies on the
dollar, if any compensation at all, to those suffering losses. 38 “No one
predicted that Iraq would not export any oil for five years, creating
repeated funding crises” for the UNCC.39 In 1998, the prospect of the
UNCC actually paying out large claims was not promising and “still
very much a question mark.”40 In this first five-year period, when Iraq
declined to cooperate,41 funds available for compensation came only
from liquidated, foreign-held Iraqi assets, voluntary contributions, and
loans by states.42 In April 1995, UNSC Resolution 986 established the
so-called Oil-For-Food program that allowed billions of dollars in Iraqi
oil sales every six months, but Iraq declined to cooperate and actually
make such sales until December 1996.43 The UNSC set ceilings on
Iraq’s oil sales revenues: first $2 billion, then $5.2 billion, then $3
billion, and then final removal of the ceiling altogether in 1999 under
supra note 33 (contending that the “A” claims awards solely for departures represented a
“jurisdictional landmark”).
35. Boisson de Chazournes & Campanelli, supra note 17, at 17.
36. S.C. Res. 705, ¶ 2 (Aug. 15, 1991).
37. John R. Crook, Mass Claims Processes: Lessons Learned Over Twenty-Five Years, in
REDRESSING INJUSTICES THROUGH MASS CLAIMS PROCESSES: INNOVATIVE RESPONSES TO
UNIQUE CHALLENGES 41, 57 (Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2006) (noting that the UNCC
was operational for several years before Iraq began to participate in the UN Oil-For-Food
program in 1996, which assured “a secure source of funding”).
38. See generally Townsend, supra note 3, at 1012-13.
39. Ronald J. Bettauer, Policy Issues Surrounding the Creation and Operations of the
UNCC, in WAR REPARATIONS, supra note 33, at 3, 6.
40. Ulmer, supra note 32, at 7-8.
41. See Andrea Gattini, The UN Compensation Commission: Old Rules, New Procedures on
War Reparations, 13 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 161, 181 (2002).
42. Hans van Houtte, Hans Das & Bart Delmartino, The United Nations Compensation
Commission, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 364 (Pablo de Greif ed., 2006).
43. Id.
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UNSC Resolution 1284.44 In 2000, under UNSC Resolution 1330—
reacting to the controversy generated by the UNCC’s massive award to
the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation—the UNSC reduced the level of
Iraq’s compensation contribution from 30% to 25%.45 Between 1996
and 2003, Iraqi oil sales totaled $65 billion, thus yielding more than $15
billion for the UNCC compensation fund.46 Following the Second Gulf
War in Iraq, UNSC Resolution 1483 (2003) reduced the percentage of
the oil revenue paid by Iraq into the UNCC compensation fund from
25% to 5% of oil revenues (and disentangled compensation from
sanctions).47 This led to reduced funding, leading the UNCC to reduce
the amount it paid out annually in compensation.48 UNSC Resolution
1956 (2010) affirmed the 5% of oil proceeds figure,49 but starting in
December 2014, after considering Iraq’s request for relief based on “the
extraordinarily difficult security circumstances in Iraq and the unusual
budgetary challenges,” the UNCC Governing Council postponed all
Iraqi payments until 2016,50 then until 2017,51 and then until 2018.52 In
November 2017, Iraq proposed to resume graduated payments of oil
proceeds into the compensation fund—namely 0.5% in 2018, 1.5% in
2019, and 3% from 2020—and, significantly, continue until the last
outstanding award is paid in full (which is anticipated by the end of
2021).53
Reductions and postponements in the payments of Iraqi oil
proceeds have significantly prolonged the life span of the UNCC. The
compromises resulting in extensions meant that, over time, all claims

44. Id.
45. Id. at 366; see also Mojtaba Kazazi, Summary of Remarks: Part 2: The UNCC and
Future International Claims Practice, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 333, 333-34 (2005)
[hereinafter Kazazi].
46. van Houtte, et al, supra note 42, at 364.
47. Id. at 376.
48. Id. at 376-77.
49. Id. at 375.
50. U.N. Compensation Comm’n Governing Council Dec. 272, U.N. Doc S/AC.26/Dec.272
(Dec. 18, 2014).
51. U.N. Compensation Comm’n, Governing Council Dec. 273, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.26/Dec.273 (Oct. 28, 2015).
52. U.N Compensation Comm’n, Governing Council Dec. 274, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.274
(Nov. 3, 2016).
53. U.N. Compensation Comm’n, Governing Council Dec. 276, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.26/Dec.276 (Nov. 21, 2017); see Press Release, U.N. Compensation Comm’n, Governing
Council of United Nations Compensation Commission Concludes Its Eighty-Fifth Session, U.N.
Doc. PR/2018/7 (Nov. 7, 2018).
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could be paid out. The international community’s political will was
essential in securing funding for the UNCC.54
As of January 2019, the UNCC has paid out $48.1 billion, leaving
only $4.3 billion to be paid on an award decided in 2000 for $14.7
billion for the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation, which is the UNCC’s last
outstanding award.55 I therefore expect that the UNCC could close
definitively in 2021 after paying $52.4 billion in awards over the course
of thirty years.
Before the Second Gulf War, in 2002, commentators, foreseeing
greater Iraqi intransigence on paying compensation and growing
political opposition to UN sanctions (with which the UNCC was often
conflated), had explained the difference between the compensation and
sanctions regimes and anticipated that the international community
might consider “debt relief” for Iraq that would effectively ending the
UNCC.56
Initially, “Iraq denounced the UNCC repeatedly. [After the Second
Persian Gulf War that saw the “U.S.-led coalition” invade Iraq and
depose Saddam Hussein, the new government] became more
cooperative.”57 The new Iraqi government was willing to work with the
UNCC, though this was years after the establishment of the UNCC.58
B. Payment of Interest
My 1995 comment recalled that the UNCC issued a decision early
on to include interest owed on awards, as accrued from the date of the
loss to the date of payment, but the Governing Council was split at that
time as to the lawfulness of such interest payments under international
law and was unable to fix an interest rate.59 Iraq had also formally
objected to being liable for interest.60 Paying interest seemed to me to be
a potential ‘straw that breaks the camel’s back,’ because any delay in
54. Fred Wooldridge & Olufemi Elias, Humanitarian Considerations in the Work of the
United Nations Compensation Commission, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 555, 579 (2003).
55. Press Release, U.N. Doc. PR/2019/1, supra note 18.
56. David D. Caron & Brian Morris, The UN Compensation Commission: Practical Justice,
not Retribution, 13 Eur. J. Int’l L.183, 199 (2002).
57. Lea Brilmayer, Understanding IMCCs: Compensation and Closure in the Formation
and Function of Intentional Mass Claims Commissions, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 273, 298 (2018).
58. Cymie R. Payne, Legal Liability or Environmental Damage: The United Nations
Compensation Commission and the 1990-1991 Gulf War, in GOVERNANCE, NATURAL
RESOURCES, AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING 719, 735 (Carl Bruch, et al. eds., 1st ed.
2016).
59. Townsend, supra note 3, at 994-95.
60. Id.
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settling claims would mean accrual of significant amounts of interest
owed, particularly in light of the lack of adequate funds to even pay the
principal amount of claims awards.61 In March 2005, with Iraq still
objecting to paying interest, the Governing Council “finally decided not
to follow up on this issue, which meant not awarding interest,
[considering] in particular the unavailability of adequate funds and the
imminent completion of the Compensation Commission’s claims
processing program.”62 On this point, the Governing Council’s prudent
decision in 2005 belatedly coincided with my analysis.
While the UNCC effectively “finished its work and closed its
doors in 2005,”63 with Commissioners having completed their work in
panels making recommendations on claims the “UNCC itself is still in
operation to correct duplicate awards and to make additional [and
eventually in 2021, final] payments.”64 Since 2013, the UNCC has been
awarding compensation in tranches for the one outstanding claim.65
Depending on Iraqi oil sales, final payment on this one outstanding
claim should occur in 2021.

61. Id. at 995.
62. Dra en Petrovi , The UN Compensation Commission, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 849, 857 (James Crawford, et al. eds., 2010); see U.N. Compensation Comm’n,
Governing Council Dec. 243, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.243 (Mar. 10, 2005); John Lonsberg,
Summary of Remarks: Part 2: The UNCC and Future International Claims Practice, 99 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 332, 336 (2005) (pointing out that had the UNCC decided from the start
not to award interest on claims, claimants would have saved much unnecessary “time and work”
calculating such interest).
63. Brilmayer, supra note 57, at 295.
64. Arturo J. Carrillo & Jason S. Palmer, Transnational Mass Claim Processes (TMCPs) in
International Law and Practice, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 343, 372 (2010).
65. See e.g. Press Release, U.N. Compensation Comm’n, United Nations Compensation
Commission Pays Out US $90 Million, U.N. Press Release PR/2018/5 (Oct. 23, 2018) (noting
recent payment of US $90 million towards the last claim); Press Release, U.N. Compensation
Comm’n, United Nations Compensation Commission Pays Out US $1.13 Billion, U.N. Doc.
PR/2013/3 (Apr. 25, 2013) (noting only one claim remained); Press Release, U.N. Compensation
Comm’n, United Nations Compensation Commission Pays Out US $1.09 Billion, U.N. Doc.
PR/2012/6 (Oct. 25, 2012) (noting only two claims remained); Press Release, U.N. Compensation
Comm’n, United Nations Compensation Commission Pays Out US $1.3 Billion, U.N. Doc
PR/2012/5 (July 26, 2012) (noting only six claims remained); Press Release, U.N. Compensation
Comm’n, United Nations Compensation Commission Pays Out US $1,038,375,281 Billion, U.N.
Doc. PR/2011/8 (Oct. 27, 2011) (noting only eight claims remained); Press Release, U.N.
Compensation Comm’n, United Nations Compensation Commission Pays Out US
$1,059,048,547, U.N. Doc. PR/2011/5 (July 28, 2011) (noting only nine claims remained); Press
Release, U.N. Compensation Comm’n, United Nations Compensation Commission Pays Out US
$674.2 million, U.N. Doc. PR/2010/1 (Jan. 28, 2010) (noting only ten claims remained); see
generally Press Releases 2014-2019, United Nations Compensation Comm’n,
https://uncc.ch/2014-2019 (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
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IV. ASSESSMENT OF UNCC IN ITS 27TH YEAR OF 30
My 1995 comment outlined precedent that the UNCC had
established by then.66 In subsequent years, the UNCC proved to be
innovative and sought to be fast but fair. The UNCC’s innovations
included: prioritizing claims of individuals (over corporate and
governmental claims); using computing tools; categorizing claims;
tailoring evidentiary requirements and standards per category; making
awards for environmental damage; providing experts to assist Iraq to
challenge claims; and affording more due process to Iraq over time.67
Other observers have also noted the UNCC’s “rich treasury of
jurisprudence” particularly on “causation and valuation issues on
contractual and non-contractual losses.”68
A. Fast but Fair?
A successful claims settlement mechanism must render correct
decisions and act fairly towards the parties without undue delay. 69 Those
who created the UNCC faced two institutional design challenges:
making a claims system that was fast but fair, and dividing
proportionally an “inadequate pie” among claimants.70 A third
challenge—that of handling claims for damage to the environment—
was looming further down the road.71 Caron, analyzing the UNCC in
retrospect, described the institution as having faced two broad stages:
the first where it quickly processed about 2.5 million mass claims (for
categories “A” to “C”),72 and the second stage (for categories “D” to
“F”) requiring a shift to individualized case review, holding oral
proceedings, inviting more Iraqi participation, conducting site visits,

66. Townsend, supra note 3, at 999-1006.
67. Boisson de Chazournes & Campanelli, supra note 17, at 15-16.
68. Carver, supra note 10, at 326; Kazazi, supra note 45, at 331-32.
69. Crook, supra note 37, at 48 (noting that the UNCC “was marked throughout by a
recurring tension between the needs for accuracy and fundamental fairness, and for timely claims
processing at acceptable cost”).
70. David D. Caron, The United Nations Compensation Commission: Understanding an
Institution and the Three Phases of Its Work, Introduction, in WAR REPARATIONS, supra note 33,
at xxvii.
71. Id.
72. Michael Raboin, UNCC Origin, Structure, and Operations, Summary of Remarks, 99
AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 327 (2005) (noting that the UNCC “spent most of the first five years
concentrating on these humanitarian claims. This was partly because we had not real funds to
operate beyond these categories”).
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and raising evidentiary requirements.73 Caron attributed the UNCC’s
speed in the first stage to the key decisions it took in setting fixed
amounts for categories of claims,74 standardizing the evidence required
to prove a claim, and using computers to cross-check claims against
databases (airline registers, for example).75 Interestingly, Caron
remarked that the UNCC at this stage “was trying not to think only like
a lawyer.”76 One lawyer that represented Kuwait suggested, however,
that the UNCC was “unduly strict” in its rejection of claims lacking
documentation because it failed to appreciate that Kuwaiti ministries
had “suffered massive destruction during the [Iraqi] invasion.”77
B. Priority Given to Claims of Individuals
The UNCC’s paying out of claims to individuals on an urgent
basis, accepting late claims, compensating the costs of charitable relief
provided to refugees, and limiting the administrative fees governments
could charge claimants were due to “humanitarian” considerations and
benefited more than a million individuals, mostly workers from Egypt,
Jordan, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the Philippines.78
This prioritization also reflected the UNCC’s expectation that funding
for all compensation might run out. Claimants in categories “A” to “C”
were largely successful as the UNCC awarded 93, 67 and 57% of the

73. Caron, supra note 70, at xxxi-xxxiv; Boisson de Chazournes & Campanelli, supra note
17, at 12 (noting that the UNCC used a “multi-speed regime for evidence”); Rajesh Singh,
Raising the Stakes: Evidentiary Issues in Individual Claims Before the United Nations
Compensation Commission, in The Int’l Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed.),
REDRESSING INJUSTICES THROUGH MASS CLAIMS PROCESSES: INNOVATIVE RESPONSES TO
UNIQUE CHALLENGES (2006) 61, at 93 (noting the UNCC “effectively used a sliding scale
approach to evidential burdens”); see id. at 62 (noting that the evidential burden was lower for
smaller claims and it was higher for bigger claims); see id. (noting the UNCC did not change the
legal standard of proof of “balance of probabilities,” but relaxed the evidence required to “simple
documentation” for “A” and “B” individual claimants); see id. at 73 (individual claimants
represented 99.7% of all claims before the UNCC); see also U.N. Compensation Commission
Governing Council Dec. 10, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/10, Provisional Rules for Claims
Procedures, art. 35(2)(a) and (b) (June 26, 1992) (relating to “Evidence” and establishing the
requirement of “simple documentation”).
74. Arif H. Ali & Marguerite C. Walter, Principles of Valuation Taken from the UNCC
Perspective, in WAR REPARATIONS, supra note 33, at 81, 101 (noting the UNCC’s instructive
“valuation jurisprudence”).
75. Caron, supra note 70, at xxxii.
76. Id.
77. John Lonsberg, Summary of Remarks, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 328-29 (2005).
78. Wooldridge & Elias, supra note 54, at 555, 564, 569-70, 577 (2003).

TECH_TO_EIC (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

8/17/2020 1:37 PM

UNCC: Mass Reparations Apotheosis

337

amount claimed, respectively, while the average success rate for
corporate and government claims, as of 2003, was only 16%.79
C. A Sizable Institution that Applied Innovative Tools
The UNCC’s mass claims processing relied heavily on the support
of a substantial secretariat and the “use of modern information
technology.”80 The secretariat had as many as three hundred staff
members.81 As Caron put it, the UNCC secretariat “arguably became, in
some respects, the most influential organ.”82 The UNCC ran “seventeen
separate claims programs, with nineteen panels of three commissioners
each.”83 Commissioners had six months to decide claims, or twelve
months if the claims were large and complex.84 Usually, the UNCC
Governing Council quickly approved the panel’s recommendations and
awards—as it viewed its role as not one of close scrutiny but checking
“only for basic consistency with the claims criteria”—and only rarely

79. Id. at 578-79.
80. Heike Niebergall, Overcoming Evidentiary Weakness in Reparation Claims
Programmes in Carla Ferstman, Mariana Goetz & Alan Stephens (eds.), REPARATIONS FOR
VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, SYSTEMS IN PLACE
AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING 145, 148 (2009) [hereinafter SYSTEMS].
81. INT’L MASS CLAIMS PROCESS: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES (Howard M.
Holtzmann & Edda Kristjánsdóttir (eds., 2007) 302 (noting “[a]t its height, it had at one time
approximately three hundred professional and general service staff in Geneva, Switzerland. These
included legal staff, accountants, loss adjusters, statisticians, information technology specialists,
and administrative support staff from a number of different countries”); id. (noting the Secretariat
was organized into: (i) the Office of the Executive Secretary; (ii) the Claims Processing Division,
consisting of legal services branch, support for verification and valuation of claims, and a claims
registry; (iii) the Support Services Division, whose functions include payment of claims and the
administration of the Compensation Fund, and information section; (iv) the Executive Offices, as
part of the Support Services Division, responsible for personnel and budgetary matters, and; (v)
the Governing Council Secretariat). Up to 2005, the Secretariat “employed 206 lawyers
throughout its existence.” Raboin, supra note 72, at 328.
82. Caron, supra note 70, at xxx.
83. Raboin, supra note 72, at 327-28.
84. John P. Gaffney, The United Nations Compensation Commission: A Structural and
Procedural Overview, 65 ARBITRATION: JOURNAL OF THE CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF
ARBITRATORS 214 (1999); see also Robert C. O’Brien, Government and International
Organization Claims Precedential Claims by Governments for Damage to Diplomatic Property
and Related Losses, in WAR REPARATIONS, supra note 33, at 329, 358 (noting “[t]his judicious
use of the designation [“large and complex” for claims] allowed the panels much-needed time to
evaluate and settle the F1 claims, as well as to invite greater participation from both the claimants
and Iraq”).

TECH_TO_EIC (DO NOT DELETE)

338

8/17/2020 1:37 PM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 42:3

did it delay approval or seek clarifications.85 The UNCC budget was
approximately $41 to $50 million per year.86
The UNCC’s processing innovations lead to efficiencies by:
requiring computerized submission; requiring (and distributing to
States) a standardized claim form; and designing a database to receive,
organize, and provide access to the entirety of the claim information. 87
The UNCC also applied a “two-stage process: a precedent-setting phase
[on representative claims, decided by panels] and an application phase”
in which the secretariat staff “applied the decisions to the [groupings of]
remaining similar claims.”88 The UNCC took this model from category
“A” claims and expanded it to subsequent claims categories.89 These
“innovative methods” serve as a model for future claims procedure and
institutions.90
D. Environmental Claims
With respect to environmental claims, the UNCC’s decisions have
“significantly contributed . . . to the development of international
environmental law.”91
In 1990–1991, during the First Gulf War, retreating Iraqi soldiers
set alight more than six hundred oil wells and dumped millions of
gallons of oil into the sea in the Persian Gulf. Natural resources thus
served as the pretext for war, and as instruments for victims of
aggression.92 The UNCC’s compensation for such environmental
damage represented a precedent (as indicated in my comment). 93
Moreover commentators view its handling of environmental
compensation as relatively speedy, efficient (especially when compared

85. Ronald Bettauer, Summary of Remarks, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 331 (2005); but
see Kazazi, supra note 45, at 333-34 (noting that in 2000 the UNCC Governing Council took a
few months of political consultations and reached a “compromise” to approve the $15.9 billion
award to the Kuwait Petroleum Company on its E1 claim but consider enhancing Iraq’s
participation, and that payment of pending claims “is more subject to political circumstances”).
86. See van Houtte, et al, supra note 42, at 370.
87. Norbert Wühler, Summary of Remarks, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 329, 338 (2005).
88. Id. at 329-30.
89. Id. at 329.
90. Jean-Christophe Martin, La pratique de la Commission d’indemnisation des Nations
Unies pour l’I
en m t e e
l m t on env onnement le [The practice of the United
Nations Compensation Commission for Iraq in environmental claims], in LE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL FACE AUX ENJEUX ENVIRONNEMENTAUX 257, 273 (A. Pedone ed., 2010).
91. Id.
92. Payne, supra note 58, at 719.
93. Townsend, supra note 3, 993.
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to domestic cases like that of the Exxon Valdez oil spill that took twenty
years), and successful, particularly in its tracking, monitoring and
assessing environmental damage.94 Commentators note that the UNCC’s
granting awards for monitoring and assessment (effectively studies and
surveys to impute environmental damage to the Gulf War) was
innovative as it represented “the first time in the history of claims
commissions that costs incurred in collecting the evidence necessary for
the submission of claims were deemed compensable.”95 Equally
innovative was the UNCC’s compulsory follow-up tracking that
ensured claimants spent award payments on the agreed, remedial
environmental objectives.96
On environmental claims, Caron observed that the UNCC made a
mistake in not prioritizing them early on and in waiting until 1998 to
address them, because state agencies could have mitigated more
environmental damage if awarded compensation earlier.97 Nevertheless,
Caron assessed the UNCC panel handling these complex environmental
claims as having made a positive and remarkable shift by ordering the
use of monitoring and assessment activities to protect the environment,
and suggesting reasonable projects funded by awards to ameliorate the
environment.98 This was also an innovative approach.
E. Affording Greater Due Process Over Time
Proceedings before the UNCC were purportedly inquisitorial
rather than adversarial in nature.99 Some even argue the UNCC process,
like the UNSC, was inherently political.100 What is telling about the
94. Payne, supra note 58, at 746.
95. Boisson de Chazournes & Campanelli, supra note 17, at 13-14; Carver, supra note 10, at
326 (noting that “Iraq paid for all of the UNCC’s operations and even, in the case of the
environmental claims, for work done by claimants to determine whether a claim existed at all”);
Michael Schneider, Summary of Remarks: Part 1: UNCC Origin, Structure, and Operations, 99
AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 330 (2005) (noting that for the F4 claims, “Iraq even funded
monitoring and assessment programs to assist claimants in identifying the existence and extent of
claims!”).
96. Boisson de Chazournes & Campanelli, supra note 17, at 14; see also Martin, supra note
90, at 257.
97. Caron, supra note 70, at xxxiii-xxxv.
98. Id. at xxxvi-xxxvii; see also Peter H. Sand, Compensation for Environmental Damage
from the 1991 Gulf War, in LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND ARMED CONFLICT 318-23 (Karen
Hulme ed., 2017).
99. See Wooldridge & Elias, supra note 54, at 557.
100. Lalanath de Silva, Reflections on the United Nations Compensation Experience, in
GOVERNANCE, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING 761-62 (Carl
Bruch, Carroll Muffett & Sandra S. Nichols eds., 2016) (contending that “[t]he United States and
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UNCC is that its panels over time, after starting with an early debate on
Iraq’s lack of standing or right to “defend” itself,101 invited
progressively more Iraqi participation in the proceedings. This
participation varied from receiving submissions on claims, holding oral
proceedings, hearing from Iraqi representatives, and appointing counsel
to support Iraq to afford it greater due process as was appropriate to the
various categories of claims.102
In its early years, observers criticized the UNCC for what they
perceived as a lack of due process and pointed out that in the UNCC
process, “Iraq is not given the right to be heard as a defendant. Much
worse, Iraq does not have the right to dispose of its own funds to avail
itself of the very limited opportunities for comments that it has in these
proceedings.”103 At the request of the United States (which wanted to
avoid delaying, procedural tactics), the UNSC established the UNCC to
be administrative (not judicial) in nature and greatly limited Iraqi
participation from the start; most proceedings were virtually ex parte.104
The UNCC transmitted only large and complex claims “to Iraq for
comments.”105 Oral hearings before the UNCC were relatively rare, and
when “hearings were held, representatives of Iraq were allowed to
attend for purposes of answering questions put by the
Commissioners.”106
other Western powers, including the United Kingdom, played a major role in the 1990-1991 Gulf
War. There is ample material to support the view that the UNCC’s rules and claims outcomes,
including the environmental claim outcomes, were influenced by these political dynamics”).
101. THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION: A HANDBOOK 15 (Marco Frigessi
di Rattalma & Tullio Treves eds., 1999); id. at n.36 (noting that article 36 of the UNCC
Provisional Rules also allowed panels to invite any government, including Iraq, to present its
views in oral proceedings).
102. Timothy J. Feighery, The United Nations Compensation Commission, in THE RULES,
PRACTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 525 (Chiara
Giorgetti ed., 2012).
103. Michael E. Schneider, How Fair and Efficient is the UNCC System? A Model to
Emulate?, 15(1) J. INT’L ARB 1 (1998); see John R. Crook, The UNCC and its Critics: Is Iraq
Entitled to Due Process, in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION: THIRTEENTH
SOKOL COLLOQUIUM 95 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1995).
104. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 533; Ronald J. Bettauer, Establishment of the United
Nations Compensation Commission: The U.S. Government Perspective, in THE UNITED NATIONS
COMPENSATION COMMISSION: THIRTEENTH SOKOL COLLOQUIUM 29 (Richard B. Lillich ed.,
1995); Danio Campanelli, The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC): Reflections
on Its Judicial Character, 4 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 107, 125 (2005); Robert C.
O’Brien, The Challenge of Verifying Corporate and Government Claims at the United Nations
Compensation Commission, 31 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 1, 28 (1998) (arguing that permitting Iraq a
larger role in the proceedings risked causing “serious delays”).
105. INT’L. MASS CLAIMS PROCESS, supra note 81, at 267.
106. Id. at 233.

TECH_TO_EIC (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

UNCC: Mass Reparations Apotheosis

8/17/2020 1:37 PM

341

The Governing Council, after some cajoling,107 decided in 2001 to
permit Iraq to submit its views and “benefit from the assistance of
experts for preparing its comments,”108 the cost of which the UNCC
bore.109 For environmental (“F4”) claims, the UNCC permitted greater
Iraqi participation because these claims were complex and legally
novel. After overcoming the UNCC’s administrative hurdles, Iraq
retained and relied upon a sizable legal, technical and scientific team,
just in time for the second and subsequent instalments of the
environmental claims.110 Iraq “seized this opportunity and took a very
active part in the proceedings, defending its interests in a constructive
manner and assisting, within the limits of its possibilities, the panel in
its search for a fair and just outcome to the extent to which the system
allowed such an outcome.”111
The UNCC thus evolved over time and afforded Iraq
“participatory space” in the claims process with respect to large
environmental claims, “similar to that of a defendant in a civil suit or
party to an arbitration.”112 Key political actors in the UNCC influenced
this evolution.113 The panel (and its legal team under the secretariat)
deciding the third to the fifth instalments of the environmental claims
“consistently supported expanding Iraq’s” participation to clarify issues
and bolster the credibility and legitimacy of the panel’s decisions. 114 In
107. Kazazi, supra note 45, at 334 (noting a 2001 political compromise that saw the: (1)
UNCC Governing Council agree to consider enhancing Iraqi participation; (2) the UNCC
Governing Council award $15.9 billion to the Kuwait Petroleum Company; and (3) the UNSC
reduce Iraq’s contribution to compensation from 30 to 25%. Iraq had requested expanded
representation at least five years earlier); see Bhushan Bahree, Iraq Stakes Claim to Funds
Earmarked for Compensation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1996, (Eur. Ed.), at 2 (reporting that the Iraqi
government states that it needs UNCC funds pay for its “legal defense” against compensation
claims).
108. Boisson de Chazournes & Campanelli, supra note 17, at 11; U.N. Compensation
Comm’n Governing Council Dec. 124, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/2001/124, annex (June 19, 2001)
(“arrangement to provide technical assistance to Iraq in respect of environmental claims before
the UNCC”) (permitting Iraq to select experts “freely,” seeking a “full range of views,”
authorizing $3 to $5 million US dollars for such experts to be paid directly by the UNCC, and
noting that this arrangement “cannot be construed as a precedent … [nor does it] create any
changes to the Rules.”); see also U.N. Compensation Comm’n Governing Council Dec. 114, U.N.
Doc. S/AC.26/Dec. 114 (Dec. 7, 2000), ¶ 22 (discussing “technical assistance” to Iraq).
109. Kazazi, supra note 45, at 334 (noting that altogether the UNCC provided Iraq with $14
million “in technical assistance to defend the environmental claims”).
110. Michael E. Schneider, The Role of Iraq in the UNCC Process with Special Emphasis on
the Environmental Claims, in WAR REPARATIONS, supra note 33, at 135, 156-59.
111. Id. at 135.
112. De Silva, supra note 100, at 761-62.
113. Id. at 762.
114. Id. at 762-63.
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the third to fifth instalments of the environmental claims, the UNCC
had greatly expanded “due process” procedures for Iraq (beyond the
initially granted right to file reports and access to basic claims
materials) including: (1) responding in writing to claims; (2) granting
extensions to Iraq; (3) affording legal and technical aid to Iraq from
UNCC funds; (4) allowing requests for documents by counsel for Iraq;
(5) disclosing monitoring and assessing material to Iraq; (6) providing
to Iraq the responses to interrogatories submitted by claimants; (7)
meeting with the panel’s experts; and (8) holding more extensive oral
hearings. The UNCC, however, did not afford Iraq an opportunity to
participate in on-site inspections.115 To “Iraq’s credit,” it adopted a
“cooperative strategy” to “help the panel reach the right decision” when
the UNCC afforded it technical assistance that fostered wider Iraqi
participation in the process.116
F. The UNSC’ Dete m n t on of St te Re pon b l ty to P y
Compensation
Though it represented an innovation in New York (and not in
Geneva, the seat of the UNCC), from a legal standpoint, it is important
to mention that the UNSC’s establishing of Iraqi liability still remains
an important precedent under the law of state responsibility. 117 The
efficiency and effectiveness of the UNCC rested on this foundation,
forged from UNSC concerted action at the time.
V. CONCLUSION
The UNCC was as exceptional as was the UNSC’s extraordinary
enforcement action in the 1991 Gulf War, and arose in “a very
particular historical and political context.”118 In the future, the UN may
be called upon to establish and oversee a regime for compensation, and
such a regime would benefit from understanding the UNCC’s
innovations and lessons learned.

115. Id. at 764.
116. Michael Schneider, Summary of Remarks: Part 2: The UNCC and Future International
Claims Practice, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 335 (2005).
117. Townsend, supra note 3, 1002-3; see generally ALEXANDROS KOLLIOPOULOUS, LA
COMMISSION D’INDEMNISATION DES NATIONS UNIES ET LE DROIT DE LA RESPONSABI IT
INTERNATIONALE [THE U.N. COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY] 247-446 (2001).
118. Boisson de Chazournes & Campanelli, supra note 17, at 15.
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Despite early critics describing the UNCC as a “completely
misconceived [model that] should be discarded as soon as possible,”119 I
would beg to differ as do the overwhelming majority of commentators
that deem the UNCC to be a success.120 As one commentator noted in
2005, after “14 years of effective work,” no one can doubt now the
UNCC’s authority or legitimacy.121
The UNCC achieved its goal of deciding voluminous (2.7 million)
claims—the highest in the history of claims commissions122—in a “fair
and efficient manner” in less than fifteen years. 123 The “sheer volume of
its work, and the fact that this work was completed in such a relatively
short time, make the UNCC a unique success story as a post-conflict
claims resolution mechanism.”124 In sum, Feighery attributes its success
to its innovative design, flexible approaches, use of information
technology, and the skill of its commissioners.125
Following the UNCC, other mass claim settlement mechanisms for
victims of armed conflict benefitted from the model set by the UNCC,
including the Commission for Real Property Claims in Bosnia, the
Housing and Property Claims Commission in Kosovo, and the Claims
Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland.126 The
UNCC also may have served as inspiration for a proposed UN fund to
compensate victims of terrorist acts.127 One academic even posits that
the international community should go even further and set up an
international court of civil justice.128 In any case, the UNCC certainly set
a new standard for post-conflict compensation institutions.129
119. Schneider, supra note 103, at 12; id. at 8, 12 (contending the UNCC process violated
Iraqi sovereignty, amounted to “victor’s justice” because the relevant UNSC resolutions never
“have been accepted by Iraq” and should have been based on model of consensual arbitration);
see also Michael Schneider, Summary of Remarks, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 330 (2005)
(describing the UNCC as a “disgrace”).
120. See e.g. Carver, supra note 10, at 325; Wühler, supra note 87, at 338.
121. Bettauer, supra note 85, at 337-38.
122. Boisson de Chazournes & Campanelli, supra note 17, at 15.
123. Linda A. Taylor, The United Nations Compensation Commission, in SYSTEMS, supra
note 80, at 197, 213.
124. Feighery, supra note 102, at 515.
125. Id. at 515-16.
126. See van Houtte, et al., supra note 42, at 369, n.185.
127. S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 10 (Oct. 8, 2004) (requesting consideration “of establishing an
international fund to compensate victims of terrorist acts and their families”); see generally
Crook, supra note 37, at 57.
128. See generally, MAYA STEINITZ, THE CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF CIVIL
JUSTICE (2018); Maya Steinitz, The Case for an International Court of Civil Justice, 67 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 75 (2014).
129. See Campanelli, supra note 104, at 139.
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The success of the UNCC is partially attributable to the relative
consensus within the UNSC that characterized the years of the UNCC’s
operation. “We can be grateful that the [international] political
dynamics in 1991 allowed for the UNCC’s creation and its ensuring
success for the practical application of state responsibility principles.”130
One knowledgeable observer recently stated that the positive political
context that facilitated the establishment and success of the UNCC was
one that only occurs “once in a generation.”131

130. Bettauer, supra note 85, at 338.
131. Telephone interview with Veijo Heiskanen, Jan. 16, 2019.

